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SOVEREIGNTY AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
DOCTRINE: UP THE STREAM OF COMMERCE
WITHOUT A PADDLE
PAMELA J. STEPHENS*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE last decade has been a very active one for Supreme Court
pronouncements on personal jurisdiction.' Nonetheless, however
numerous, the collection of decisions has failed to clarify personal ju-
risdiction doctrine. If anything, doctrine in the personal jurisdiction
area is less clear, less tied to the stated theoretical underpinnings than
when the decade began. From the relatively flexible standard of Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington,2 which replaced the strict territori-
ality-based rule of Pennoyer v. Neff with a standard oriented,
instead, toward the fairness and reasonableness concerns of the due
process clause, 4 the Court has moved to a rigid two-step formulation
of the personal jurisdiction test, which once again emphasizes sover-
eignty and territoriality.'
Since its decision in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,6
wherein the Court insisted that a defendant's purposeful contacts with
the forum state are a condition precedent to a consideration of
* Professor, Vermont Law School; B.A., 1971, Ohio State University; J.D., 1975, Uni-
versity of Cincinnati.
I. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990); Ashai Metal Indus. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980);
Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
4. [D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain mini-
mum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'
326 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added).
5. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294.
6. 444 U.S. 286.
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whether personal jurisdiction is fair,7 it has become increasingly clear
that the two-step personal jurisdiction standard is unworkable. The
consequence of having established such a rigid, unworkable standard
is a series of decisions that open by stating the World-Wide Volkswa-
gen test, cite the language of World-Wide establishing sovereignty as
key to personal jurisdiction doctrine, and finally go on to decide the
case before the Court without application of the test nor adherence to
the theory.8
The degeneration of personal jurisdiction doctrine, the division on
the Court, and the resulting unprincipled decision making is nowhere
more clearly illustrated than in the Supreme Court's decision in Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.9 Asahi was a personal jurisdic-
tion case in which the Court was unable to form a majority view of
the rationale for the decision. A majority of the justices clearly re-
jected the World-Wide Volkswagen dictate, yet the court cited that
opinion approvingly throughout. 0 Asahi was followed by still another
fragmented opinion last year."
It is obvious, in reading the recent Supreme Court decisions, that
the current formulation of doctrine is neither adequate to explain
those decisions nor to predict future results. This Article suggests a
new formulation of personal jurisdiction theory. Unlike suggestions
by other commentators which focus solely upon the reasonableness or
fairness of taking jurisdiction over an absent defendant, 2 this Article
concludes that the Court is wedded to the concept of sovereignty and
its continuing role in personal jurisdiction doctrine. 3 Therefore, I pro-
7. The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen concluded that the petitioners failed to demon-
strate sufficient minimum contacts and, therefore, did not reach the question of whether an
assertion of jurisdiction by the Oklahoma courts was fair. Id. at 299.
8. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); See also, Stephens, The Single Contract as Minimum
Contacts: Justice Brennan "Has It His Way" 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 89 (1986); Stewart, A
New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction, 60 U. CoLo. L. REv. 5 (1989).
9. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
10. Eight members of the Court concluded that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over
petitioner Asahi did not comport with "fair play and substantial justice," id. at 113-16; how-
ever, four members of that majority also concluded that minimum contacts were absent. Id. at
112-13. Consistent with the World-Wide Volkswagen scheme, the question of fairness should
never have been reached. Only Justice Scalia, finding no sufficient contacts, did not reach the
fairness step.
11. Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
12. See, e.g., Lewis, A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under
Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1984); Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal
Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112 (1981).
13. For a well-reasoned and persuasive account of why sovereignty continues to emerge as a
theme in Supreme Court decisions in spite of efforts to downplay its importance, see Stein,
Styles of Argument on Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEx. L.
REV. 689 (1987).
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pose to join, in part, those who have suggested a reconciliation be-
tween choice of law and personal jurisdiction doctrines. 4 By making
the consideration of whether a forum may apply its own law to a par-
ticular case an explicit part of a personal jurisdiction determination,
territorial concerns embodied in the constitutional limitations on
choice of law will be incorporated into the personal jurisdiction stan-
dard. However, this Article additionally suggests that the most recent
Supreme Court decisions can only be explained by a theoretical frame-
work that depends on acceptance of sovereign power and territoriality
as essential to assertions of personal jurisdiction. Combined with a
traditional due process analysis, which scrutinizes the fairness of an
assertion of jurisdiction, such a reformulation should accommodate
the two prongs which historically dominate personal jurisdiction the-
ory.
This Article will examine briefly the evolution of the current per-
sonal jurisdiction standard. It then will use the stream of commerce
cases to illustrate the degeneration of that standard, a degeneration
which culminated in the confusion of the Asahi opinion. Finally, the
Article will suggest a reformulation of jurisdictional doctrine that em-
phasizes a reconciliation with choice of law theory, while at the same
time acknowledging that other fundamental notions of sovereign
power continue to dominate personal jurisdiction doctrine. This refor-
mulation will have both explanatory and predictive value.
II. EVOLUTION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court's decision in International Shoe represented a
repudiation of the established personal jurisdiction rule and, seem-
ingly, the theory underlying that rule. It appeared, however briefly,
that assertions of personal jurisdiction were to be allowed whenever
reasonable and fair.' 5 The Court's view of the new personal jurisdic-
tion probably reached its zenith in McGee v. International Life Insur-
ance Co.'6 But by 1980, World- Wide Volkswagen'7 was only the latest
14. See, e.g., Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Laws, 78 MICH. L. REv. 872
(1980); Peterson, Proposals of Marriage Between Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 14 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 869 (1981); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv.
33 (1978); Stein, supra note 13; von Mebren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Com-
pared and Evaluated, 63 B.U.L. REv. 279 (1983).
15. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
16. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The Court upheld personal jurisdiction in California over a foreign
insurance company which assumed an insurance policy issued to a California resident. The in-
surance company did no other business in the forum state. The Supreme Court held that "[it) is
sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial
connection" with the forum state. Id. at 223.
17. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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in a line of cases in which the Court moved the jurisdictional standard
away from an emphasis on fairness and reasonableness and toward an
emphasis on the territoriality and sovereignty concerns embodied in
the minimum contacts test. 8
In World- Wide, the Court acknowledged that the
concept of minimum contacts ... can be seen to perform two
related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant
against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.
And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not
reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as
coequal sovereigns in a federal system.19
The latter function is served by the requirement that a defendant have
purposeful minimum contacts with the forum and it is this require-
ment the Court chose to emphasize in World- Wide, citing Hanson v.
Denckla0 for the proposition that:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience
from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State;
even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the
controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient location
for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of
interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its
power to render a valid judgment. 2'
The source of such a federalism function was nowhere explained by
the Court. From the language in Hanson, then, comes the inevitable
conclusion that the defendant's contacts and ties with the forum are a
threshold requirement for personal jurisdiction.2 Absent such con-
tacts, the Court did not need to consider the interests of the plaintiff
or the forum state, nor the presence or absence of inconvenience to
18. Id. at 294.
19. Id. at 291-92.
20. 357 U.S. 235 (1958), reh'g denied, 358 U.S. 858.
21. World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294. The Court also cites Hanson language:
'ITlhe requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the
rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington. But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise
of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. Those restrictions are
more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.'
Id. (citations omitted). But see Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Gui-
nee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10. (1982).
22. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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the defendant. If, and only if, the defendant had such contacts with
the forum, might the court have gone on to consider the reasonable-
ness of asserting personal jurisdiction in light of those other factors.
The Court went on to explain that the defendant's contacts must be
purposeful, not fortuitous, 23 and that the "mere 'unilateral activity of
those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant can-
not satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State."' 24 For
those reasons the Court disallowed the Oklahoma state court's asser-
tion of jurisdiction over the New York retailer of an automobile and
over the regional distributor located in New York, who did business in
New York, New Jersey and Connecticut. Although a car the retailer
and regional distributor sold was driven to Oklahoma, where it ex-
ploded during an accident because of an allegedly defective gas tank,
such a contact was deemed insufficient to satisfy the test set out by the
Court .25
The Court was careful, in its discussion of "mere unilateral activ-
ity," to distinguish the situation in which a manufacturer or distribu-
tor's sale of a product "is not simply an isolated occurrence, but
arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve di-
rectly or indirectly, the market for its product in other states." 26 In
oft-quoted language the Court stated that "[t]he Forum State does
not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts per-
sonal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the
stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased
by consumers in the forim State." ' 27 The Court then cited Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.2 as an example of a
stream of commerce case and left the lower courts and commentators
to grapple with the distinction thus apparently made between goods
which are brought into a state by consumers and cause injury and
23. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
24. Id. at 298 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253).
25. Id. at 299. For an argument that "strict" personal jurisdiction as well as strict substan-
tive tort liability was a choice open to the Court, see Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due
Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WAsH. U.L.Q. 479 (1987).
26. World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
27. Id. at 297-298.
Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor ... is not simply an
isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to
serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not unrea-
sonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise
has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others.
Id. at 297.
28. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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goods which are sent into the state by a manufacturer or distributor,
purchased there by a "consumer," and then cause injury. 29
III. STREAM OF COMMERCE THEORY IN THE LOWER COURTS
The Supreme Court offered little in the way of rationale for the
distinction outlined above. Soon after that decision the lower courts
were confronted with the issue, and although the contexts of the cases
varied, a broad consensus emerged as to the meaning of the Supreme
Court's distinction.'3
Most of the courts that considered the issue held that personal juris-
diction could be premised upon a party's placement into the stream of
commerce of a product which landed in the forum state. 3' Those
courts found that the Supreme Court intended a broad exception in
World- Wide for defendants who made use of the stream of commerce
to distribute their products, which eventually caused injury. 32 The ma-
jority of courts considered the extent of a defendant's control in the
29. See infra notes 30-51 and accompanying text.
30. For a thorough discussion of the caselaw, see Dayton, Personal Jurisdiction and the
Stream of Commerce, 7 REv. OF LITIGATION 239 (1988). "By the time the Court rendered its
Asahi decision early in 1987, courts in at least sixteen states, and most federal appellate courts
had ruled that the stream of commerce theory comported with the principles articulated in Inter-
national Shoe and its progeny." Id. at 267-68. See also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 117 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "[M]ost courts and commentators have
found that jurisdictions premised on the placement of a product into the stream of commerce is
consistent with the Due Process Clause, and have not required a showing of additional con-
duct." Also, "[t~he Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit appears to be the only Court of
Appeals to have expressly adopted a narrow construction of the stream-of-commerce theory...
although the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has implicitly adopted it." Id. at 118,
n.2.
31. See, e.g., McBead Drilling Co. v. Kremco, Ltd., 509 So. 2d 429, 432 (La. 1987); Hewitt
v. Eichelman's Subaru, Inc., 492 A.2d 23, 25-26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Tonka Corp. v. TMS
Entertainment, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 386, 389 (D. Minn. 1985); Copiers Typewriters Calculators,
Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312, 317 (D. Md. 1983); Noel v. S. S. Kresge Co., 669 F.2d
1150, 1153-55 (6th Cir. 1982); Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980). In addition
to the caselaw accepting a broad stream of commerce theory, several states revised their long
arm statutes to reflect the Court's decision in World- Wide Volkswagen. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.05.015(4)(B) (1983); FLA. STAT. § 48.193(l)(f)(2) (1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201(8)
(West Supp. 1987); NEV. REv. STAT. § 14.080 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(4)(b) (1983); 42
PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5322(a)(1)(iii) (Purdon 1981).
32. E.g., Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Technology Corp., 744 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1984)
(holding that defendant manufacturer of steel castings, which introduced thousands of its prod-
ucts into the stream of commerce, including two ultimately used in construction of an allegedly
defective dredge in Louisiana, and which sought the broadest market possible without making
any attempt to limit the states in which its castings would be sold, was subject to jurisdiction in
Louisiana).
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distribution process unimportant in the jurisdictional analysis. 3 In-
stead, a court following the majority approach looked to whether the
defendant was aware of the distribution scheme.3 4 If the defendant
was aware, the court found that defendant to be indirectly serving the
market, and receiving economic benefit from that distribution and
marketing scheme. 3 Given this awareness and the economic benefit
derived, most courts had no trouble finding that such a defendant
"should reasonably anticipate being subject to suit in any forum
within that market where the defendant's product caused injury." 36
The lower federal courts also held that a foreign manufacturer
could not protect itself by using an elaborate distribution scheme and
then disclaiming awareness. For example, in Poyner v. Erma Werke
GmbH, 37 the defendant German manufacturer of firearms argued that
because it had sold its product to an independent New York distribu-
tor, it should not have been subject to personal jurisdiction in Ken-
tucky in a products liability action brought by a Kentucky resident.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district court's de-
nial of personal jurisdiction, holding, "the use of an independent dis-
tributor so that the manufacturer is only indirectly responsible for the
product reaching an injured consumer, in and of itself, will not insu-
late a non-resident foreign corporation from suit." '3
Similarly, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania upheld personal jurisdiction in a products liability suit by a heli-
copter purchaser against the manufacturer of the helicopter and the
French manufacturer of the helicopter parts. In Rockwell Interna-
33. E.g., Nelson v. Park Industries, Inc., 717 F.2d 1120, 1126 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied
sub nom., Burnam Tony & Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 465 U.S. 1024 (1984).
Further, [defendant-manufacturer) submits that it had no control over the flannel
shirts once they were sold to [distributor] and that it made no efforts to distribute the
shirts anywhere. However, even though [defendant-manufacturer] did not originate
the distribution system and do[es] not control it, they did place the flannel shirts in
and move them along a stream of commerce destined for retail sale throughout the
United States in Woolworth's retail stores .... [A] critical fact is whether those de-
fendants were aware of that distribution system. If they were aware . . . they should
reasonably anticipate being subject to suit in any forum within that market where their
product caused injury.
Id.
34. d.; Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distributors Pty., Ltd. 647
F.2d 200, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
35. Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein, 647 F.2d at 204; Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Construzioni
Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta, S.P.A., 553 F. Supp. 328, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Poyner v. Erma
Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d 1186, 1190 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., Insurance Co. of
North America v. Poyner, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
36. Nelson, 717 F.2d at 1126.
37. 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1980).
38. Id. at 1190 (citing Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1%9)).
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tional Corp. v. Construczione Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta, 9 the
court applied stream of commerce theory to find that even though the
foreign defendant's "involvement in the sale and distribution of the
ball bearing may be once or twice removed from Augusta's final sale
to Rockwell, SNFA's purposeful availment ... actually took place at
an earlier point. That occurred when SNFA decided to enter and ex-
ploit the international 'executive corporate transport market'. . .."40
A complex distribution scheme should not, the court held, prevent an
injured plaintiff from seeking redress against a foreign manufacturer.
Moreover, a manufacturer or major distributor should not be
allowed to profit from the sale of its product in a state, while
simultaneously insulating itself from liability by establishing an
indirect and multi-faceted chain of distribution. Simply because a
business operation is structured in such a way as to avoid direct
activity in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania would not prevent
the state courts from imposing personal jurisdiction upon the non-
resident defendant.4 1
The Tenth Circuit also has endorsed a broad stream of commerce
theory. In Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Philadelphia Resins Corp.,42
the court stated:
If a defendant's product comes into the forum state as a result of a
deliberate, although perhaps indirect, effort of the defendant to
serve the forum state's market, then that defendant is subject to
jurisdiction there. Placing one's product into the 'stream of
commerce' with the expectation of distribution into particular areas
is the classic example of such an indirect effort.43
Only one circuit that considered this issue expressly formulated a
narrow construction of stream of commerce theory. In Humble v.
Toyota Motor Co.," the Eighth Circuit found that personal jurisdic-
tion could not be properly asserted over a foreign manufacturer of car
seats, reasoning that even though the manufacturer could have per-
ceived that its product would find its way into Iowa, where the seat
manufacturer never advertised, solicited any business, or otherwise
sought to serve any market in the United States, but merely sold its
39. 553 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
40. Id. at 331.
41. Id. at 334 (citations omitted).
42. 766 F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1985).
43. Id. at 446.
44. 727 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1984).
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products to foreign car manufacturer in Japan, the manufacturer was
not subject to personal jurisdiction in Iowa.45
Unclear from the court's opinion is the weight given to the fact that
the defendant was a manufacturer of component parts. That factor
aside, the court formulated a standard which apparently requires a
defendant manufacturer to do more than place a product, which even-
tually ends up in the forum state, into the stream of commerce. Ad-
vertising, soliciting business, and attempting to directly serve the
forum market all are activities that evidence a defendant's "purpose-
ful availment" and that the defendant should reasonably foresee be-
ing haled into court in the forum."6
Jurisdictional holdings in the First, Third, and Fourth Circuits re-
mained unclear.4 7 Those courts refused to apply stream of commerce
theory to support an assertion of personal jurisdiction in particular
factual situations. They did not posit a narrow view of stream of com-
merce theory but recognized limiting factors in its application. The
First and Fourth Circuits found stream of commerce theory inapplica-
ble where only a single sale occurred in the forum state. 48 The courts'
position appears to be that single sales in the forum state simply do
not constitute a stream of commerce, according to "the minimal regu-
larity due process demands. ,4 9
The Third Circuit also rejected application of stream of commerce
theory in certain situations.5 0 The court focused on the relationship
between the distributor and the defendant manufacturer and on
whether evidence "indicat[es] that [defendant] could anticipate either
use of its product or litigation in the [forum state]." 5'
IV. THE AsAi CAsE
In 1987 the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether by
releasing one's product into the stream of commerce with the expecta-
tion that it would end up in the hands of consumers in the forum
45. Id. at 710.
46. Id.
47. See, Chung v. NANA Dee. Corp., 783 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
948 (1986); Dalman Rodriguez v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 781 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1986); Max Daetwy-
ler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985).
48. See, e.g., Chung, 783 F.2d 1124; Dalman Rodriguez, 781 F.2d 9. These opinions appear
to anticipate Justice Stevens' approach in Asahi rather than that of Justice O'Connor. See infra
notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
49. Chung, 783 F.2d at 1129. This result is also consistent with the language of the Supreme
Court in World-Wide Volkswagen. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Max Daetwyler; DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers Inc., 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.
1981).
51. Max Daetwyler, 762 F.2d at 300 n. 13.
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state, one was thereby subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum . 2
Given the less than clear resolution of this question in Asahi, one
wonders why the Court sought to deal with the issue at that time.
There was no great clamoring in the lower courts for it to do so. As
has been previously suggested, most circuits simply accepted the di-
chotomy set up in World- Wide Volkswagen and adopted a broad view
of assertions of personal jurisdiction against manufacturers who par-
ticipated in an interstate chain of distribution."
Asahi was originally a products liability action. Gary Zurcher was
severely injured and his wife was killed in a motorcycle accident that
occurred in September 1978 in Solano County, California. Zurcher
alleged that the accident occurred because his rear tire exploded and
suddenly lost air. His lawsuit was filed in California state court
against Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co., Ltd. (Cheng Shin), the
Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube, and others. Cheng Shin filed a
cross complaint seeking indemnification from its codefendants and
from Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. (Asahi), the manufacturer of the
tube valve assembly. The plaintiff's claims against Cheng Shin and the
other defendants were settled and dismissed, leaving only Cheng
Shin's action against Asahi before the California courts.54
Asahi moved to quash the service of summons on the ground that
the California courts could not constitutionally assert personal juris-
diction over it.55 The superior court denied the motion to quash based
upon evidence submitted by both Asahi and Cheng Shin. 6 That evi-
dence established Asahi to be a Japanese corporation that manufac-
tured tire valve assemblies in Japan and sold those assemblies to
Cheng Shin and several other tire manufacturers for use as compo-
nents in tire tubes. Asahi's sales to Cheng Shin took place in Taiwan,
and valve assemblies were shipped from Japan to Taiwan.57
In 1978, Cheng Shin bought and used 150,000 Asahi valve assem-
blies; in 1979, 500,000; in 1980, 500,000; in 1981, 100,000; and in
1982, 100,000. Sales to Cheng Shin made up 1.24 0 of Asahi's income
in 1981 and 0.44% in 1982. Cheng Shin alleged that 20076 of its sales
52. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
53. See supra notes 30-52 and accompanying text.
54. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105-06.
55. California's long arm statute authorized the assertion of personal jurisdiction "on any
basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973). Hence, every statutory interpretation is merged into a consti-
tutional determination.
56. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 107 (citing Zurcher v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Co., No. 76180 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct., Apr. 20, 1983) (order denying motion to quash summons).
57. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106.
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in the U.S. were in California and also acknowledged that it sold its
finished product throughout the world.58
The manager of Cheng Shin stated in an affidavit:
In discussions with Asahi regarding the purchase of valve stem
assemblies the fact that my Company sells tubes throughout the
world and specifically the United States has been discussed. I am
informed and believe that Asahi was fully aware that valve stem
assemblies sold to my company and to others would end up
throughout the United States and in California. 9
Asahi countered with its own affidavit, wherein Asahi's president
maintained that "Asahi has never contemplated that its limited sales
of tire valves to Cheng Shin in Taiwan would subject it to lawsuits in
California.''60
Based on the information above, the superior court concluded that
"Asahi obviously does business on an international scale. It is not un-
reasonable that they defend claims of defect in their product on an
international scale. ' 6' The California Court of Appeals disagreed and
issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the superior court
to quash service. The appellate court was of the view that 'it would
be unreasonable to require Asahi to respond in California solely on
the basis of ultimately realized foreseeability that the product into
which its component was embodied would be sold all over the world
including California."' 62 The Supreme Court of California reversed,
discharging the writ of mandate. 63 The California Supreme Court con-
cluded that the exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi was consistent with
due process because Asahi knew that some of the valve assemblies
sold to Cheng Shin would be incorporated into tire tubes sold in Cali-
58. Id. A somewhat unusual, informal examination of the valve stems of tire tubes in one
cycle store in Solano County was conducted by an attorney for Cheng Shin. That examination
revealed that "of the approximately 115 tire tubes in the store, 97 were purported manufactured
in Japan or Taiwan, and of those 97, 21 valve stems were marked with the circled letter "A".
apparently Asahi's trademark. Of the 21 Asahi valve stems, 12 were incorporated into Cheng
Shin tire tubes." Id. at 107. The weight to be given such a declaration is unclear.
59. Id. at 107 (citing 39 Cal. 3rd 35, 48 n.4, 702 P.2d 543, 549 n.4 (1985).
60. 39 Cal. 3rd 35, 48 n.4, 702 P.2d 543, 549 n.4 (1985). One suspects from this language
that the lawyer for Asahi was aware of World- Wide's requirement that the foreseeability that is
relevant to a personal jurisdiction determination is foreseeability of being haled into court.
61. Id. at 107 (citing Zurcher v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Co., No. 76180 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct., Apr. 20, 1983) (order denying motion to quash summons).
62. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 107-8 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Cert. at B5-B6).
63. 39 Cal. 3d 35, 702 P.2d 543 (1985).
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fornia, and because Asahi benefited from the sale of those products in
California."
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Cali-
fornia court. 65 The Court's opinion consisted of several parts, only
two of which commanded majority support. A discussion of each part
in some detail follows, in order to reveal the full magnitude of the
Court's disarray.
A. Part II A
Part II A of the opinion, joined in by Justices O'Connor, Powell,
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, addressed the first stage of the
two-stage analysis which the Court formulated in World- Wide Volk-
swagen. Specifically, the Justices considered whether the nonresident,
Asahi, had purposeful contacts with the forum state, received the ben-
efits and protections of the forum state, and therefore had reason to
expect that it might be haled into court in that forum.66 Justice
O'Connor's opinion focused on the purposefulness of Asahi's con-
tacts, the concern being, apparently, that the defendant not be
brought into the state through the unilateral activities of another. 67
O'Connor attempted to align more closely the concept of purposeful
availment, found in cases like World- Wide Volkswagen, with acts of a
manufacturer who, like Asahi, places a product into the stream of
commerce. To that end, Part II A quoted language from World- Wide:
'Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor...
is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of
the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the
market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to
subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective
merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owners or to
others.'68
In O'Connor's view, the passage quoted above limits other language,
also found in World- Wide, which lower courts had interpreted to indi-
64. Id. at 49, 702 P.2d at 549-50. The California Supreme Court relied upon the decision in
World-Wide Volkswagen to support its holding that jurisdiction over Asahi was constitutional
on these facts.
65. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108.
66. Id. at 109.
67. Id. at 109-10.
68. Id. at 110 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
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cate a broader formulation of the standard for stream of commerce
cases . 9
Part II A of Asahi referred to the lower courts' treatment of cases
since World-Wide Volkswagen, in which "the defendant acted by
placing a product in the stream of commerce, and the stream eventu-
ally swept defendant's product into the forum State, but the defen-
dant did nothing else to purposefully avail itself of the market in the
forum state." 70 Some of those lower courts, the opinion noted, found
good jurisdiction premised on nothing but the defendant's act of plac-
ing the product in the stream of commerce. The opinion then went on
to adopt the position taken by the minority of courts, that "the Due
Process Clause, and the above-quoted language in World-Wide Volk-
swagen require the actions of the defendant to be more purposefully
directed at the forum state than the mere act of placing a product in
the stream of commerce." 7'
Part II A then rejects the assertion of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia that "because the stream of commerce eventually brought some
valves Asahi sold Cheng Shin into California, Asahi's awareness that
its valves would be sold in California was sufficient . . ." basis for
California to validly exercise personal jurisdiction.72 Prior cases,
O'Connor stated, required purposeful action of a defendant directed
toward the forum state, and "Itihe placement of a product into the
stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum State." ' 73 What was required,
according to the minority, was "additional conduct of the defen-
dant," such as "designing the product for the market in the forum
State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for provid-
ing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the
product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as a sales agent
in the forum State." 74 However, this opinion said, "a defendant's
awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product
into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the
69. See supra notes 30-51 and accompanying text: As discussed earlier in this Article, the
majority of circuits which had occasion to consider the language from World-Wide had con-
cluded that the Court had in fact formulated a broad stream of commerce theory. In World-
Wide, the Court stated that the "forum does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause
if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State."
Id. (quoting World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98).
70. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 110.
71. Id. at 111.
72. Id. at 110-111.
73. d. at 112.
74. Id.
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product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the
forum State." '"7
Therefore, the O'Connor opinion concluded, respondents failed to
demonstrate that Asahi had taken any action to "purposefully avail
itself of the California market. ' 76 Asahi had no office, no agents, no
employees, and no property in California. The company did not ad-
vertise or otherwise market its product there. Nor did it "create, con-
trol, or employ the distribution system that brought its valves to
California." ' 7 According to the O'Connor opinion, failure to prove
such purposeful activity was fatal to respondent's assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction.7 8
B. Part II B
All members of the Court, except Justice Scalia, joined in Part II B
of the opinion, which considered whether assertion of jurisdiction
over Asahi would offend 'traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice."' 7 9 In making its determination, the Court considered
the "burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and
the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief.'"'8 Also relevant was 'the
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient res-
olution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States
in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."'81
The Court concluded that to assert jurisdiction over Asahi under
the circumstances of the case would violate the fairness and justice
principles underlying the due process clause and the minimum con-
tacts test. 82 The Court based its conclusion on several lines of reason-
ing. First, not only had the burden on the defendant been severe in
terms of time and expense in traveling to California for trial, but,
more importantly, the defendant had been forced to submit its dispute
with Cheng Shin to a foreign nation's judicial system. "The unique
burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 113 ("On the basis of these facts, the exertion of personal jurisdiction over Asahi
by the Superior Court of California exceeds the limits of due process.").
79. Id. (quoting International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), quoting Milli-
ken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
82. Id. at 114 ("A consideration of these factors in the present case clearly reveals the un-
reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi, even apart from the question of the
placement of goods in the stream of commerce.").
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system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness
of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national bor-
ders."8 3
Second, neither the plaintiff nor the forum had significant interests
at stake. All that remained of the case before the Court was an indem-
nification claim by a Taiwanese corporation, Cheng Shin, against
Asahi. "The transaction on which the indemnification claim is based
took place in Taiwan; Asahi's components were shipped from Japan
to Taiwan. Cheng Shin has not demonstrated that it is more conven-
ient for it to litigate its indemnification claim against Asahi in Califor-
nia rather than in Taiwan or Japan." Moreover, the Court indicated
that because the plaintiff, Cheng Shin, was not a California resident,
"California's legitimate interests in the dispute have considerably di-
minished." 8 The Court rejected the position taken by the California
Supreme Court, that the State had a strong interest in protecting its
consumers from unsafe products. In response, the Court said the issue
before the California courts was not safety standards but rather in-
demnification, and the Court noted: "[I]t is not at all clear at this
point that California law should govern the question whether a Japa-
nese corporation should indemnify a Taiwanese corporation on the
basis of a sale made in Taiwan and a shipment of goods from Japan
to Taiwan. '"8
The admonition of World-Wide Volkswagen, that courts must take
into consideration the interests of the several states in "the efficient
judicial resolution of the dispute and the advancement of substantive
policies," requires that the California courts in this case consider the
"procedural and substantive policies of other nations whose interests
are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction by the California
Court." ' 87 Such interests, the Court said, will vary from case to case.
In every case, however, those interests, as well as the Federal
government's interest in its foreign relations policies, will be best
served by a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of
jurisdiction in the particular case, and an unwillingness to find the
serious burdens on an alien defendant outweighed by minimal
interests on the part of the plaintiff or the forum State.''88
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 115. The Court did not hesitate to refer to choice of law concerns in a personal
jurisdiction case to bolster its conclusion that jurisdiction ought not apply. See infra notes 147-
153 and accompanying text.
87. Id. (emphasis in original).
88. Id.
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C. Part III
Only Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Powell and Scalia concurred in
Part III of the opinion, which concluded that because the facts of the
case "do not establish minimum contacts such that the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction is consistent with fair play and substantial justice,
the judgment of the Supreme Court of California is reversed ... "89
D. Brennan's Concurrence
Justice Brennan's opinion, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, concurred in part and in the judgment. He agreed with
Part II B of the opinion that the exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi
would not have comported with fair play and justice. However, he
rejected the analysis and conclusions in Part II A and the interpreta-
tion of stream of commerce theory contained therein. Brennan char-
acterized Asahi as "one of those rare cases in which 'minimum
requirements inherent in the concept of fairplay and substantial jus-
tice . . . defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even [though] the
defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities.' 9
Justice Brennan first rejected the portion of Part II A that would
require a plaintiff to show "additional conduct" directed toward the
forum before finding jurisdiction appropriate under the stream of
commerce theory. "The stream of commerce refers not to unpredicta-
ble currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of prod-
ucts from manufacture to distribution to retail sale." 9 A company
that participated in this flow of products and was aware that its prod-
ucts were being marketed in the forum state would not, Justice Bren-
nan asserted, be surprised at the possibility of a lawsuit there, "[n]or
will the litigation present a burden for which there is no corresponding
benefit." ' 92 Such a defendant receives economic benefit from the sale
of the product in the forum state and "indirectly benefits from the
State's laws that regulate and facilitate commercial activity. These
benefits accrue regardless of whether that participant directly con-
ducts business in the forum State, or engages in additional conduct
89. Id. at 116. A majority of the Court could not join in this conclusory statement which
seems merely to restate the International Shoe test as a conclusion. This is evidence of how
polarized the Court has become as a result of the tensions inherent in the current personal juris-
diction doctrine and the weaknesses in the doctrine's theoretical underpinnings.
90. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985)).
91. Id. at 117.
92. Id.
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directed toward that State." 93 Consistent with this position, Brennan
observed that the majority of courts and commentators had found ju-
risdiction based upon placing a product into the stream of commerce
to comport with due process and had required no showing of addi-
tional conduct. 94
Brennan further maintained that the Part II A analysis was a
"marked retreat" from the position taken by the Court in World-
Wide Volkswagen, in which the Court cited approvingly the decision
of the Illinois Supreme Court in Gray v. American Radiator and Stan-
dard Sanitary Corp.91 and "took great care to distinguish 'between a
case involving goods which reach a distant State through a chain of
distribution and a case involving goods which reach the same State
because a consumer ... took them there."'%
Brennan concluded, therefore, that the California Supreme Court
correctly applied stream of commerce theory and correctly determined
that Asahi had minimum contacts with California. He supported his
conclusion by highlighting the court's finding that "'[although Asahi
did not design or control the system of distribution that carried its
valve assemblies into California, Asahi was aware of the distribution
system's operation, and it knew that it would benefit economically
from the sale in California of products incorporating its compo-
nents.'
97
E. Stevens' Concurrence
In a separate concurrence in part and concurrence in the judgment,
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices White and Blackmun, also wrote to
explain his disagreement with the Part II A analysis. First, and some-
what surprisingly, Justice Stevens argued that Part II A was not neces-
sary to the Court's decision: "An examination of minimum contacts
is not always necessary to determine whether a state court's assertion
of personal jurisdiction is constitutional."98 Because the Court in Part
II B concluded that it would be unreasonable and unfair to take juris-
diction over Asahi, and because "[t]his finding alone requires rever-
sal," Stevens felt that the Court need not have considered stream of
commerce theory in this case.99 "Accordingly, I see no reason in this
case for the Court to articulate 'purposeful direction' or any other test
93. Id.
94. Id. at 117-18, 117 n.l.
95. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d. 761 (1961).
96. Id. at 120 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 306-07
(1980)).
97. Id. at 121 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Cert. at C-I I).
98. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 121 (Stevens, J., concurring).
99. Id.
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as the nexus between an act of a defendant and the forum State that is
necessary to establish minimum contacts."'0
"Second," Stevens' concurrence continued, "even assuming that
the test ought to be formulated here, Part I-A misapplies it to the
facts of this case."'' In Stevens' view, O'Connor erroneously as-
sumed that "an unwavering line can be drawn between 'mere aware-
ness' that a component will find its way into the forum State and
'purposeful availment' of the forum's market. Over the course of its
dealings with Cheng Shin," Stevens argued, "Asahi ha[d] engaged in
a higher quantum of conduct than '[t]he placement of a product into
the stream of commerce, without more . . .,"'02 The question of
whether or not conduct such as Asahi's "rises to the level of purpose-
ful availment" required the Court to make a "constitutional determi-
nation" based upon the "volume, the value, and the hazardous
character of the components.' ' 3 The concurrence went on to suggest
that a regular course of dealing over a period of several years, which
resulted in 100,000 units annually reaching the forum State, would
probably have been sufficient to constitute purposeful availment.' °4
V. CRITIQUE OF AsAwI
In the context of a "stream of commerce" case, the Court demon-
strated most clearly to date the unworkability of the World- Wide
Volkswagen analysis. As that earlier case dictated, the Court set out
to establish the requisite minimum contacts necessary to subject a
nonresident defendant to personal jurisdiction. In the first part of its
analysis, the Court examined the facts of the case in order to assess
the purposefulness of the defendant's contacts. According to World-
Wide Volkswagen, determining that such purposeful contacts exist is a
prerequisite to the second phase of the analysis, which considers the
fairness and reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction over the defen-
dant. ,05
On first reading, one might conclude that Asahi finally brought the
Court back to a McGee type analysis. That is, one might argue that
reasonableness and fairness concerns were foremost in the Court's
collective mind and that in Asahi the Court concluded, in contrast to
McGee, that personal jurisdiction would be unfair and unreasonable.
100. Id. at 122.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Such a conclusion, however, is difficult to reconcile with those parts
of the opinion dealing with stream of commerce theory which rely
heavily upon discussions of defendant's contacts with California and
the purposeful nature of those contacts.
Moreover, even Part II B of the opinion, which concluded that as-
serting jurisdiction over Asahi offended traditional notions of justice
and fair play, had imbedded in it considerations of sovereignty and
territorial power."° Particularly significant was the Court's suggestion
that California's interest in hearing this case was weak in light of the
unlikelihood that California law would apply.1 7
Thus the Court seemed unwilling to wholly abandon sovereignty
concerns in its personal jurisdiction analysis. Yet it is also clear that
the World-Wide Volkswagen two-step analysis is unworkable. O'Con-
nor's opinion in Asahi was clearly inconsistent with the test enunci-
ated in World- Wide Volkswagen in that it went on to consider fairness
concerns even though the threshold test of minimum contacts had not,
according to her opinion, been met. 0 8 The remainder of this Article
will attempt to reconcile inconsistencies in the Court's position-in-
consistencies which result, it will be argued, from the Court's attempt
to separate out the sovereignty and fairness concerns of the Interna-
tional Shoe test. It is possible, and arguably preferable, to incorporate
sovereignty notions into a test framed in fairness and reasonableness
concerns.
The problem with this scheme as suggested in World- Wide and con-
firmed in subsequent opinions, is that it is impossible to consider de-
fendant's contacts with the forum in a vacuum. Contacts are not
neutral. 109 Reasonableness concerns come into play as soon as the
Court begins to describe the contacts, and the notion of purposeful-
ness, which is linked so closely to the sufficiency of defendant's con-
tact, is itself dependent upon reasonableness and fairness. That is, the
106. The "contacts" analysis also has fairness concerns imbedded in it, which evidences the
futility of separating out these "functions."
107. Not only did the Court raise this choice of law issue in support of its holding that
jurisdiction over Asahi was unfair, but it also deemed significant the fact that no California
resident was a party to the suit. But c.f. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984)
("[W]e have not to date required a plaintiff to have 'minimum contacts' with the forum State
before permitting that State to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.").
108. Even if one views contacts not as a threshold test but as one of two coequal require-
ments that must be met, failure to find minimum contacts eliminates the need to determine
fairness.
109. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdic-
tion, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 77, 77-78; Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction,
63 WASH. U.L.Q. 377, 405 (1985) ("To say that particular effects are irrelevant to liability is to
say that they are not the events that the law seeks to regulate in establishing a rule of liability.").
19911
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Court will discuss certain contacts and the sufficiency of those con-
tacts, for purposes of personal jurisdiction, in light of its conviction
that asserting jurisdiction based upon certain kinds of contacts is in-
herently fair or unfair, reasonable or unreasonable (or as Professor
Brilmayer has characterized it, in light of its determination that cer-
tain contacts count)." 0
By trying to treat sovereignty and fairness as separate and distin-
guishable concerns, the Court has imposed upon itself a rigid analyti-
cal framework that leads inevitably to unprincipled decision making-
decision making which purports to resolve legal issues based upon a
certain theoretical analysis but which cannot, in fact, do so."'
The stream of commerce cases illustrate quite clearly the Court's
dilemma and the inadequacy of its analytical method. By distinguish-
ing cases such as Gray v. American Radiator from the World-Wide
case, the Court created a problem for itself that it was unable to re-
solve in Asahi. The Court indicated that while a defendant, whose
product is carried by the plaintiff to a distant forum where it causes
injury, has not demonstrated a sufficiently purposeful contact, a man-
ufacturer, who takes advantage of the stream of commerce to deliver
its product to the forum state, is subject to jurisdiction there if injury
results." 2 The Court explicitly stated in the World-Wide that, with re-
110. Brilmayer, supra note 109. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-790 (1984).
Although the Court acknowledged that mere foreseeability that a product will cause harm in a
jurisdiction was insufficient to support personal jurisdiction, it allowed the assertion of jurisdic-
tion over a National Enquirer writer and editor because their
(lintentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California. Peti-
tioner South wrote and petitioner Calder edited an article that they knew would have a
potentially devastating impact upon respondent. And they knew that the brunt of that
injury would be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and works and in
which the National Enquirer has its largest circulation. Under the circumstances, peti-
tioners must 'reasonably anticipate being haled into Court there' to answer for the
truth of the statements made in their article.
Id.
Leaving aside for the moment the circularity of the "reasonably anticipates" test, it is clear
that underlying the Court's conclusion was the assumption that it was fairer or more reasonable
to hold petitioners accountable for intentional acts aimed at the forum. One need only contrast
the differing treatment of allegedly negligent acts in World-Wide and Asahi. In Calder these
petitioners had no control over final publication or distribution, yet the Court had no difficulty
finding sufficient contacts.
Another example of the Court's deciding which contacts count as a way of determining
whether jurisdiction exists is Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), in which the father's
act of sending his daughter to California (clearly an act directed at the forum) is not sufficient to
meet the "effects" test.
11l. For a suggestion that differing views of "fairness" held by members of the Court may
impact on decision making, see Maltz, Unravelling the Conundrum of the Law of Personal Ju-
risdiction: A Comment on Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 1987
DUKE L.J. 669.
112. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
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gard to such a manufacturer, "it is not unreasonable to subject it to
suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has
there been the source of injury to its owner or to others.""' 3
The first problem, then, in articulating an analytical framework for
stream of commerce cases is deciding whether the Court's formulation
of the stream of commerce theory in World-Wide was meant to an-
swer both prongs of the personal jurisdiction test or just the first.
That is, is demonstrating that a manufacturer has placed a product
into the stream of commerce knowing it will end up in the forum
state, where it injures a consumer, in and of itself sufficient to satisfy
the personal jurisdiction test? Or must the Court independently con-
sider the fairness of such a jurisdictional assertion? The language of
World-Wide suggests the latter is subsumed by the former." 4 Asahi,
on the other hand, seems to separate the two determinations, arguably
with little success. The O'Connor opinion on contacts certainly antici-
pated and was influenced by her perception of the inherent unfairness
of upholding jurisdiction based on the facts of that case.
The practical consequences of the Asahi opinion will be few. Given
the division on the Court regarding stream of commerce doctrine,
lower federal and state courts are likely to continue as before, await-
ing a definitive Supreme Court decision in this area. Moreover, by
determining that the state of California unfairly asserted jurisdiction
over Asahi, the Court provided little guidance to the lower courts.
The facts in Asahi were so peculiar (the foreign defendant, the indem-
nification nature of the claim, the foreign plaintiff) that few courts
will find the case helpful."5
Separating out the two aspects of the personal jurisdiction test
seems unworkable because the concerns which inform those aspects
are interrelated. Additionally, such a separation arguably places too
little emphasis on sovereignty concerns in some instances and too
much in others. That sovereignty interests play an appropriate role in
any given case is merely fortuitous.
VI. BURNHAM V. SUPERIOR COURT
While this Article particularly focuses on personal jurisdiction in
the stream of commerce context, the more general and necessary focus
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. For a discussion of immediate post-Asahi caselaw, see Dayton, Personal Jurisdiction
and the Stream of Commerce, 7 REV. OF LITIGATION 239, 245-47 (1988). See also Maltz, supra
note I I I (concluding that the significance of the decision lies in the fact that Asahi was an alien
defendant).
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is on personal jurisdiction doctrine itself. Certainly, one cannot for-
mulate a credible alternative to the Court's version of personal juris-
diction analysis without considering its most recent decision on the
subject." 6 In May of 1990 the Supreme Court decided Burnham v.
Superior Court' 7 and answered a question which was left unresolved
after Shaffer v. Heitner."8 In Burnham, the defendant, a New Jersey
resident, was served with process regarding a divorce action while vis-
iting in California. Defendant was in California to see his children
and to conduct business. Appearing specially in the California action,
he moved to quash the summons on the grounds that he lacked suffi-
cient minimum contacts with the state of California to be subject to
personal jurisdiction there. The superior court denied his motion, and
his mandamus petition was also denied by the California Court of Ap-
peal. The California courts were of the opinion that because he was
personally served while physically present in the state, the due process
requirements of the fourteenth amendment were satisfied." 9
In another fragmented decision, Justice Scalia announced the judg-
ment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined, and Justice White joined in
part. The Court upheld assertion of personal jurisdiction where serv-
ice of process was made upon a defendant who was physically present
in the forum state, even though the defendant had no other contacts
with the forum and left the state immediately after he was served.12
Justice Scalia concluded: "[A]mong the most firmly established prin-
ciples of personal jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts
of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically pres-
ent in the State."' 2' In a lengthy discussion of the history of this rule,
he acknowledged that it may have originally been based upon a mis-
reading of English common law which it purported to follow, but
was, in any event, well established in this country by the time the
fourteenth amendment was adopted. ,22
This American jurisdictional practice is, moreover, not merely old; it
is continuing. It remains the practice of, not only a substantial
number of the States, but as far as we are aware all the States and
the federal government-if one disregards (as one must for this
116. The implications in this decision for the role of sovereignty concerns in personal juris-
diction doctrine are particularly important.
117. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
118. 433 U.S. 186 (1978).
119. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2108.
120. Id. at 2115.
121. Id. at 2110.
122. Id. at 2111.
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purpose) the few opinions since 1978 that have erroneously said, on
grounds similar to those that petitioner presses here, that this Court's
due-process decisions render the practice unconstitutional.,',
Justice Scalia went on to reject the notion that International Shoe
was meant to change that traditional rule. According to Scalia, Inter-
national Shoe merely held that a defendant's "litigation-related 'mini-
mum contacts' may take the place of physical presence as the basis for
jurisdiction." 24
Nothing in International Shoe or the cases that have followed it,
however, offers support for the very different proposition petitioner
seeks to establish today: that a defendant's presence in the forum is
not only unnecessary to validate novel, nontraditional assertions of
jurisdiction, but is itself no longer sufficient to establish jurisdiction.
That proposition is unfaithful to both elementary logic and the
foundations of our due process jurisprudence. 25
Relying heavily upon the longstanding acceptance of such transient
personal jurisdiction, Scalia concluded:
The short of the matter is that jurisdiction based on physical
presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the
continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due process
standard of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice." That standard was developed by analogy to "physical
presence," and it would be perverse to say it could now be turned
against that touchstone of jurisdiction. 26
Lastly, Scalia turned to what he characterized as petitioner's "strong-
est argument," that Shaffer v. Heitner required the Court to consider
transient personal jurisdiction in light of "the standards set forth in
International Shoe and its progeny.' ' 27 He rejected this argument as
well, noting that "Shaffer, like International Shoe, involved jurisdic-
tion over an absent defendant, and that the case stands for nothing
more than the proposition that when the 'minimum contact,' that is a
substitute for physical presence, is established by property ownership,
it must, like other minimum contacts, be related to the litigation."'' 2
123. Id. at 2113 (emphasis in original).
124. Id. at 2114.
125. Id. at 2115.
126. Id. (emphasis in original).
127. Id., citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1978).
128. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Scalia asserted that the holding in Burnham in no way contradicted
Shaffer. He acknowledged, however, that:
Our basic approach to the due process question is different. We have
conducted no independent inquiry into the desirability or fairness of
the prevailing in-state service rule, leaving that judgment to the
legislatures that are free to amend it; for our purposes, its validation
is its pedigree, as the phrase 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice' makes clear. 129
In Scalia's view, the Court was not compelled to consider whether
such service of process met contemporary standards of due process.
Justice White concurred in the judgment, writing separately to indi-
cate his view:
The rule allowing jurisdiction to be obtained over a non-resident by
personal service in the forum state, without more, has been and is so
widely accepted throughout this country that I could not possibly
strike it down, either on its face or as applied in this case, on the
ground that it denies due process of law guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 30
In order to strike down such a traditionally accepted practice, Justice
White would apparently have required a showing that "as a general
proposition the rule is arbitrary and lacking in common sense in so
many instances that it should be held violative of Due Process in every
case."'I'
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and
O'Connor, concurred in the judgment. He wrote separately to disa-
gree with the proposition that "a jurisdictional rule that 'has been im-
memorially the actual law of the land,' . . . automatically comports
with due process simply by virtue of its 'pedigree."" '11 2 While acknowl-
edging the relevance of history in establishing whether a jurisdictional
rule satisfies due process, Brennan would undertake an "independent
inquiry into the ... fairness" of such a rule. Such an independent
inquiry is required by the Court's decision in Shaffer. "The critical
insight of Shaffer is that all rules of jurisdiction, even ancient ones,
must satisfy contemporary notions of due process. No longer were we
content to limit our jurisdictional analysis to pronouncements that
129. Id. at 2116 (emphasis in original).
130. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2119 (White, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 2119-20.
132. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2116 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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'the foundation of jurisdiction is physical power."""3 That the Court
was willing to abandon the rule regarding quasi in rem jurisdiction in
Shaffer is a clear indication, Brennan suggested, that the Court "did
not believe that the 'pedigree' of a jurisdictional practice was disposi-
tive in deciding whether it was consistent with due process .... If we
could discard an 'ancient form without substantial modern justifica-
tion' in Shaffer .... we can do so again.' ' 34
Having said all of that, Brennan did not, in the final analysis, dis-
card transient personal jurisdiction. Applying the minimum contacts
analysis, he found sufficient evidence that the defendant purposefully
availed himself of the benefits and protections of the state of Califor-
nia, and that the potential burdens the defendant would suffer in de-
fending the suit would be very slight. 35 Moreover, Brennan was
willing to conclude, more generally, that "as a rule the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on his voluntary presence
in the forum will satisfy the requirements of due process.' ' 36
The final opinion in the case is that of Justice Stevens, his concur-
rence concluding that "the historical evidence and consensus identi-
fied by Justice Scalia, the considerations of fairness identified by
Justice Brennan, and the common sense displayed by Justice White,
all combine to demonstrate that this is, indeed, a very easy case."' 37
Once again the Court confirms that its current doctrine is inade-
quate to the task of deciding whether personal jurisdiction exists.
Once again the Court is unable to muster a majority for any one of
the various theories which might support jurisdiction in this case. And
once again it is necessary to look to what the Court has done, rather
than what the Court has said it was doing, to make any sense of the
Burnham opinion.
Underlying all the opinions in Burnham is the notion of sover-
eignty, of power based upon territoriality and the presence of the de-
fendant in that territory. The Scalia opinion, as well as the opinion of
Justice White, makes no pretense that fairness or reasonableness lie at
the heart of the determination that defendant Burnham should be sub-
ject to the power of the state of California. 3 8 Scalia's opinion is not
133. Id. (quoting McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917)).
134. Id. at 2121.
135. Id. at 2125.
136. Id.
137. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2126 (Stevens, J., concurring).
138. "That continuing tradition [transient personal jurisdiction], which anyone entering Cal-
ifornia should have known about, renders it 'fair' for Mr. Burnham, who voluntarily entered
California, to be sued there for divorce-at least 'fair' in the limited sense that he has no one but
himself to blame." Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2118.
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only replete with references to territoriality and sovereignty, 3 9 but it
also evidences real hostility to the notion that personal jurisdiction de-
terminations might depend upon a case-by-case assessment of fairness
or reasonableness:
The "contemporary notions of due process" applicable to personal
jurisdiction are the enduring "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice" established as the test by International Shoe. By
its very language, that test is satisfied if a state court adheres to
jurisdictional rules that are generally applied and have always been
applied in the United States.140
Scalia's view is certainly a novel interpretation of what the Court
meant in International Shoe, and it is one generally at odds with the
analysis the Court has employed since that case. His interpretation
specifically conflicts with the holding in Shaffer. One would have a
difficult time supporting an argument that jurisdictional assertions
based on property ownership are somehow less valid than jurisdic-
tional assertions based on the defendant's physical presence in the
state with the justification that property ownership has not been
blessed with the "pedigree" of recognition accorded to the defen-
dant's presence. Scalia's attempt to distinguish the two concepts is
clearly unsatisfactory. Even if one accepts Scalia's view that quasi in
rem jurisdiction was at issue in Shaffer because of the fiction that it
was the property rather than the person being sued and that therefore
explained the court's willingness to abandon the historical rule, by his
own characterization of the test in International Shoe, the historical
acceptance of that practice would render it consistent with "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice," and therefore with
due process.
Even Justice Brennan, who purports to be applying a fairness test,
finds reasonableness upon very little more than traditional notions of
power and sovereignty and on the absence of any compelling evidence
of inconvenience to the defendant. He seems to give very little weight
to the defendant's interest and to find those interests met on very little
evidence. This is hardly the emphasis one would expect from a justice
focusing upon fairness.
The obvious conclusion one draws, from both the result in Burn-
ham and the various opinions, is a sense that the Court is reverting
back to physical presence and territoriality as the bases for personal
jurisdiction. The Court relies not upon fairness or reasonableness con-
139. Id. at 2109-19.
140. Id. at 2117 (emphasis in original).
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cerns of the petitioner before it but instead upon sovereign power as
traditionally defined: power over one physically present. The Burn-
ham decision is thus further evidence of the Court's frustration with
the minimum contacts analysis. International Shoe was supposed to
do away with reliance upon physical presence as the core of jurisdic-
tional doctrine and to substitute an analysis, as Judge Learned Hand
had suggested, which addresses the real concern underlying the due
process clause: Is it fair and reasonable to subject the defendant to
jurisdiction in this forum?' 41
The lower courts are left then with a theory of personal jurisdiction
with which the Court itself is clearly uncomfortable, and which lacks
the very predictability the Court sought to provide. The remainder of
this Article will suggest that much of the dissonance experienced by
the Court in its efforts to apply the personal jurisdiction test could be
eliminated by a standard which looks, instead, to choice of law doc-
trine to satisfy the territoriality concerns of the Court, but retains the
fairness component of the current analysis.
VII. THE NEw TERRITORIALITY
A. Choice of Law and Personal Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court has consistently expressed the view that per-
sonal jurisdiction and choice of law are two very different doctrines,
which are informed by different concerns. The Court has thus far re-
sisted attempts to treat the two doctrines as parallel.'4 2 However, given
the clear relationship between the two, 43 it is not surprising that the
Court has occasionally resorted to use of portions of the analysis on
one to consider the other. In two of its most recent personal jurisdic-
141. "In the end there is nothing more to be said than that all the defendant's local activi-
ties, taken together, do not make it reasonable to impose such a burden upon it." Hutchinson v.
Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1930).
142. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958), reh'g denied, 358 U.S. 858:
As we understand [Florida's] law, the trustee is an indispensable party over whom the
court must acquire jurisdiction before it is empowered to enter judgment in a proceed-
ing affecting the validity of a trust. It does not acquire that jurisdiction by being the
'center of gravity' of the controversy, or the most convenient location for litigation.
The issue is personal jurisdiction not choice of law.
Id.; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (in which the Court found due process
allows personal jurisdiction over absent plaintiff class members but found insufficient "contact"
with the controversy to support the assertion of Kansas law over the controversy). See also
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
143. See Silberman, supra note 14, at 88 ("If the Court has the power to apply its own law,
it should have the power to exercise jurisdiction over the action" (emphasis in original).); Mar-
tin, supra note 14, at 873; Stein, supra note 13, at 739-48; von Mehren, supra note 14, at 323.
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tion cases, the Court considered choice of law factors to determine the
jurisdictional question.'"
Commentators have been more willing than the Court to assert the
connection between the doctrines 45 and to urge their reconciliation
upon the Court. Interestingly, most of the scholarly effort in this re-
gard appears to be from the perspective of conflicts scholars. Those
scholars suggest that the Supreme Court should more closely scruti-
nize choice of law determinations, and the Court should employ in
those cases a "minimum contacts" test like the one used in personal
jurisdiction cases.' 4"
Recently there have been some proposals to the contrary, that is,
that the personal jurisdiction analysis should more closely resemble
the choice of law test. These proposals appear, generally speaking, to
take one of two forms: either the suggestion that the Supreme Court
has already, in fact, adopted a personal jurisdiction standard for spe-
cific jurisdiction cases that is identical to that for choice of law deter-
minations; 47 or, that a choice of law standard should replace the
minimum contacts test of International Shoe.'" This Article disputes
these characterizations as neither a satisfactory statement of the law as
it exists nor as it should be. Instead, this Article proposes a reconcilia-
tion of the two doctrines which recognizes that differences between
them exist and might be reflected in the analysis. This reconciliation
would also recognize other sovereignty concerns that should be re-
flected in the balance.
144. In Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), the Court used the
possibility that California could not or would not apply its law to the indemnity question to
support its conclusion of unfairness. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984),
the Court considered whether it was "fair" to subject defendant to nationwide damages in New
Hampshire, even though only a small portion of those copies were distributed in New Hamp-
shire. In resolving this question, the Court focused in part on New Hampshire's "interest" in
asserting jurisdiction. The answer, the Court said, "[Diepends to some extent on whether res-
pondent's activities relating to New Hampshire are such as to give that State a legitimate interest
in holding respondent answerable on a claim related to those activities." Id. at 776. The Court
went on to consider New Hampshire's regulatory interest regarding torts committed in that state,
even citing the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Law at one point. However, the Court said
the question of whether New Hampshire's statute of limitations should apply was left to be
decided "only after jurisdiction over respondent is established, and we do not think such choice-
of-law concerns should complicate or distort the jurisdictional inquiry." Id. at 778.
145. See Dayton, supra note 115.
146. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 14, at 873.
147. See, e.g., Cox, The Interrelationship of Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Forg-
ing New Theory Through Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 49 U. Prr-r. L. REV. 189,
190 (1987) ("This article asserts that the first stage of the minimum contacts test for determining
specific in personam jurisdiction is identical to the test for determining whether a forum is enti-
tled to apply its law to a part of any controversy before it.").
148. See Hill, Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
960, 987-93 (1981); Silberman, supra note 14, at 80-90.
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B. Suggested Analysis
As has been suggested elsewhere, most notably in a recent article by
Professor Stein,149 the history of personal jurisdiction doctrine in this
country is tied to notions of sovereignty. Those courts and commenta-
tors who suggest that the Supreme Court has abandoned territoriality
as a precept of such jurisdiction ignore not only that history; they ig-
nore the doctrine as it is today framed and articulated by the Court.'"
Explicit recognition of the territoriality component would help to clar-
ify personal jurisdiction doctrine. The "new territoriality" of authors
such as Professor Stein and Professor Weisburd is not the territorial-
ity of Pennoyer v. Neff. Instead, it is a territoriality which focuses
upon the sovereign's interest in regulating certain activities or transac-
tions which impact upon the forum,' or which focuses upon the rela-
tionship between the limits of sovereign power and the due process
rights of defendants.5 2 Fairness to the defendant, within the meaning
of the due process clause, would remain the touchstone of jurisdic-
tional analysis. The new analysis would simply acknowledge that fair-
ness is not to be determined in a vacuum, but instead must be
determined with reference to the legitimate sovereign authority of the
forum state.'33
While Professor Stein's proposed analysis goes a long way toward
reinfusing notions of sovereignty into the personal jurisdiction deter-
mination, the concern of this Article remains that it may go too far in
making regulatory authority the necessary equivalent of a fair asser-
tion of jurisdiction,3 4 and yet not far enough in acknowledging other
aspects of sovereign power. Moreover, suggesting that if a state has
sovereign authority to apply its own law it should fairly be able to
assert personal jurisdiction simply proves too much. That suggestion
fails to recognize that different functions may be served by choice of
law and jurisdictional determinations, and it fails to adequately ex-
plain the case falling within the general jurisdiction of the forum even
149. Stein, supra note 13; see also Weisburd, supra note 109, at 383 (contending that, just as
assertions of jurisdiction are exercises of sovereignty, limits on judicial jurisdiction derive from
limits on state sovereignty).
150. See supra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.
15 1. See Stein, supra note 13, at 739-48.
152. See Weisburd, supra note 109, at 383; Stein, supra note 13, at 706.
153. Stein, supra note 13, at 711. "Due Process limits on jurisdiction irrefutably are rights of
individual litigants, not of states; yet individual due process rights inescapably are linked to the
allocation of sovereign authority." Id. "Due process protects the sovereign interests of other
states, but only incidentally, through its protection of the individual from illegitimate assertions
of state authority." Id. at 706.
154. Id. at 703-05 (rejecting the position that the "actual burden of litigation" has real sig-
nificance in the determination of whether jurisdiction is justified).
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when the forum might not apply its own law. Both of these shortcom-
ings can be addressed by an analysis that depends upon a balancing of
sovereignty concerns, including the sovereign's ability to apply its own
law, and fairness to the defendant. This Article proposes a personal
jurisdiction doctrine that does not simply replace the current test with
the test for choice of law, but which rejects the "minimum contacts"
test in its most recent incarnation and substitutes a test that infuses
notions of sovereignty into the reasonableness calculations. The ulti-
mate determination of whether an assertion of personal jurisdiction
would be fair and reasonable under the due process clause would be a
function of both sovereign authority and the burden on the defen-
dant. For reasons outlined below, resolving the former does not al-
ways resolve the latter.
C. Establishing Sovereign Authority
The analysis suggested here would look to the forum state's sover-
eign authority over the claim before it and inquire, does the claim as-
sert conduct which the forum state has an interest in regulating?", 5 In
cases such as Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 1 6 the Supreme Court
announced a standard requiring that "for a State's substantive law to
be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must
have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creat-
ing state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair.'" Modern choice of law doctrine, operating
under the slight scrutiny test stated by the Court in Hague, has
evolved into a framework for determining whether the forum has an
interest sufficient to justify the forum in applying its own law."18 Such
155. In discussing choice of law doctrine, one must distinguish the constitutional limitations
from the various common law doctrines which seek to provide a framework within that constitu-
tional scheme for making actual choice of law decisions. While "governmental interest" analysis
seems to have dominated the latter since the 1960s, and while it is tempting to adopt both the
language and perspective of the interest analysts, generally speaking, this Article uses the terms
sovereign and regulatory interests to refer to the constitutional standard articulated by the Su-
preme Court. One must make reference to the "governmental interest analysis," but the primary
concern of this Article is the merging of the constitutional standards for personal jurisdiction
and choice of law.
156. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
157. Id. at 312-13 (upholding application of local law to a controversy arising from a foreign
accident involving residents of the foreign states); see also Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice
of Law: Constitutional Limitations, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 9 (1988); von Mehren & Trautman,
Constitutional Control of Choice of Law: Some Reflections on Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 35
(1981); Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 185 (1976).
158. For discussions of the development of modern choice of law rules and the evolution of
the governmental interest analysis, see B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
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an interest should be sufficient to provide the necessary sovereign au-
thority for taking jurisdiction in a case. However, the analysis would
not end there. The sovereign interest motivating the forum to take
jurisdiction would be balanced against the burden visited on the de-
fendant as a result of being haled to the forum. In the usual case, a
clear forum interest would place a heavy burden on the defendant to
demonstrate unfairness or inconvenience that rises to the level of a
constitutional defect.
To the extent sovereignty is recognized by the Supreme Court as
having a role in the jurisdictional analysis, it is to be considered in
light of the defendant's purposeful contacts with the forum, appar-
ently as a reflection of the defendant's consent or agreement to be so
bound. However, as this Article has already suggested, it is virtually
impossible to consider fairness to the defendant without considering
the sovereignty of the forum. Whether the relationship of the defen-
dant to the forum is grounded in consent or in exchange, 159 the under-
lying justification for power based on either theory remains constant.
Choice of law determinations clearly reflect sovereignty concerns,I1 °
and the standard used in such determinations is useful in the personal
jurisdiction context. Those concerns focus upon the state's legitimate
regulatory interests. ' 6'
(1963); Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. I (1963); Carvers,
Conflict of Laws Round Table: The Value of Principled Preferences, 49 TEX. L. REV. 211
(1971); Kogan, Toward a Jurisprudence of Choice of Law: The Priority of Fairness over Com-
ity, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1987); Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Laws
41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966); Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (1978);
Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformula-
tion 25 UCLA L. REV. 181 (1977); Westbrook, A Survey and Evaluation of Competing Choice-
of-Law Methodologies: The Case for Eclecticism, 40 Mo. L. REV. 407 (1975).
Interest analysis, while the clear modern trend, does not command the approval of a majority
of states and of late a backlash seems to have set in. See, e.g., Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and
the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392 (1980); Ely, Choice of Law and the State's
Interest in Protecting its Own, 23 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1981).
159. For a full discussion of "consent" versus "exchange" and why neither suffices to ex-
plain current theory, see Stein, supra note 13, at 734.
160. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (The Court repeatedly refers
to the state's interest in applying its own law.).
161. In an essay considering whether the full faith and credit clause or the due process clause
controls choice of law decisions, Professor Currie noted:
[li]n the discussion to follow the two clauses will not be separated for purposes of
analysis, partly because the degree of overlap is large-larger than has at times been
believed-but primarily because the essential principle underlying the operation of
both clauses is the same: neither interferes with choice of law except when the law
applied is that of a state having no legitimate interest in the application of its policy to
the case at hand.
B. CURRIE, supra note 158, at 195.
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As previously indicated, in the language of the Supreme Court, a
state's legitimate interest is constitutionally sound when the forum
state has "a significant aggregation of contacts with the parties and
the occurrence, creating state interests, such that application of its law
was neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."' 62 Most recently, the
Court has added that "[wihen considering fairness in this context, an
important element is the expectation of the parties." 63
The standard above has much in common, at least on its face, with
the minimum contacts test; both require contact with the forum, and
both contain a fairness component. In application, the two are quite
different. Choice of law determinations under the direction of the Su-
preme Court tend to be expansive in their reach, searching for con-
tacts between the litigation or claim and the forum's interest.' 64
Personal jurisdiction determinations have been more crabbed, impos-
ing more restrictions (such as the purposeful availment requirement),
on those forums seeking jurisdiction over nonresidents. Asahi, with
Justice O'Connor's restrictive interpretation of the minimum contacts
test, is an example of this latter tendency. That it should be easier for
a state to assert its laws over a nonresident than to require that a per-
son appear before it does seem, as Professor Silberman has suggested,
"counterintuitive. ' ' 61 However, this Article does not reach Professor
Silberman's conclusion that "[ilf a court has the power to apply its
own law, it should have the power to exercise jurisdiction over the
action."166
Two principal concerns should be considered regarding the advisa-
bility of using of the choice of law test for personal jurisdiction deter-
162. Hague, 449 U.S. at 320.
163. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985).
164. Hague itself indicates how tenuous the connection to the forum may be and still support
a constitutionally proper choice of the forum's law. In that case, plaintiff's husband died as a
result of an automobile-motorcycle accident which occurred in Pierce County, Wisconsin. Oper-
ators of both vehicles were Wisconsin residents, as was decedent (a passenger on the motorcy-
cle). The deceased had been employed for fifteen years in Red Wing, Minnesota, directly across
the border from Pierce County, Wisconsin, and had commuted daily. After the accident and
before initiation of the lawsuit, plaintiff moved to Minnesota, where she remarried and estab-
lished residence. Plaintiff, as a representative of her deceased husband's estate, brought suit in
Minnesota seeking to take advantage of a Minnesota rule which allowed "stacking" of three
uninsured motorist policies. The Supreme Court upheld application of Minnesota law on the
basis of the forum's "three contacts with the parties and the occurrence giving rise to the litiga-
tion:" Mr. Hague's employment in Minnesota (deemed a "very important contact" by the
Court), Allstate's doing business in Minnesota, and the plaintiff's becoming a resident of Minne-
sota prior to instituting the litigation. Notice that only the second of these relates to defendant's
"contacts" with the state and that these contacts are unrelated to the litigation before the court.
449 U.S. at 213-20.
165. Silberman, supra note 14, at 82.
166. Id. at 88 (emphasis in original).
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minations. First, under modern choice of law doctrine, forums tend to
choose their own laws. Given that tendency, simply substituting
choice of law analysis for the minimum contacts test would create ju-
risdiction in cases in which jurisdiction, by current standards, is lack-
ing. 67 While jurisdiction may be appropriate in many or most of those
cases, this Article does not concede that fairness concerns of the de-
fendant ought not prevent such assertions in certain cases. While the
choice of law constitutional standard does contain a fairness compo-
nent, that component seems to have been given little weight in the
governmental interest analysis because, seemingly by definition, sover-
eign power based upon the state's legitimate interest cannot be arbi-
trary or unfair.
Whatever may be the merits or drawbacks of the governmental-
interest approach to choice of law, it is dangerous to make it a
general test for jurisdiction as well. The danger lies in the possibility
that the jurisdictional territorialism of Pennoyer v. Neff, which
Shaffer and Kulko laid to rest, may now be replaced by the new
territorialism of the lexfori.'1
The second concern to consider in the discussion of whether to use
the choice of law analysis to determine whether sovereign authority
exists in the forum is the emphasis placed upon the plaintiff's resi-
dence. 169 In the personal jurisdiction analysis, one might argue that
too little weight has been given to the plaintiff's residence, insofar as
it represents a legitimate interest of the forum to regulate the behavior
of those who come in contact with the plaintiff. Choice of law deter-
minations might be said to err in the other direction, finding from the
mere fact of plaintiff's residence a regulatory interest sufficient to
support application of the forum's law. 70 While the plaintiff's resi-
dence may be a part of the sum of contacts that justifies deferring to
the forum's choice of law, the focus of the courts' inquiry should be
on whether that residence gives rise to a relevant regulatory interest.
Both of these concerns can be mitigated, to a large extent, in the per-
sonal jurisdiction context by assigning significant weight to the defen-
dant's interests.
In addition to considering the state's regulatory interest, and
whether that interest is sufficient to justify application of the forum's
167. Id. at 79.
168. Hay, The Interrelation of Jurisdiction and Choice-of-Law in United States Conflicts
Law, 28 INT'L& Comp. L.Q. 161, 174 (1979) (emphasis in original).
169. See Silberman, supra note 14, at 85.
170. Id. at 86.
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law, recent Supreme Court decisions, in particular Burnham, suggest
that other remnants of territoriality may prove important to the per-
sonal jurisdiction analysis. Implicit in the Burnham decision is a reli-
ance upon the view that states possess power over persons within their
territorial limits. The state's power apparently exists whether or not
those persons do anything within the forum that might subject them
to the laws of the state. The state's power also apparently exists no
matter how fleeting the persons' stay in the state. The power-based
notion of territoriality in Burnham is as pure as any the Court has
entertained since Pennoyer. The source of this power is explained no-
where, except as the result of tradition and historical circumstance.
But it seems clear that all members of the Court, even those who
would adopt the Brennan analysis, would give the notion of territorial
power great weight in the analysis.
Therefore, in addition to the sovereignty concerns implicit in the
choice of law analysis, concerns dependent upon the regulatory inter-
est of the state, one must also factor in the state's traditional power
over persons within the territory as a part of the personal jurisdiction
determination. Physical presence, once again, becomes the "baseline"
for assertions of personal jurisdiction, and it is activity analogous to
presence which the Court suggests satisfies due process.
D. Establishing an Unconstitutional Burden
The principal concern about those proposals which simply equate
choice of law and personal jurisdiction tests is that they represent a
return to a complete emphasis on territoriality and sovereign interests
of the forum. While one could agree that an explicit articulation of
sovereignty factors should be included in the analysis, due process dic-
tates that the analysis also consider the "liberty interests" of the de-
fendant.17 ' Both aspects of the analysis can be served by recognizing
that fairness is a function of both sovereign authority and the burden
on the defendant. Even if sovereign authority exists, in that the forum
has a legitimate regulatory interest in applying its own law, defendant
should be allowed to demonstrate that assertion of jurisdiction is un-
fair if the facts of a particular case so dictate. Different types of bur-
dens may carry different weights in the court's analysis.
1. Unforeseeability/Unfair Surprise
Running through both personal jurisdiction and choice of law doc-
trine is the notion that unforeseeability or unfair surprise may pre-
171. For an extensive discussion of the reasons why due process concerns of the plaintiff
ought not to be a consideration, see Weisburd, supra note 109, at 423.
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clude the forum's assertion of its sovereign interest in a given case.'7 2
The Supreme Court in Shutts indicated that lack of foreseeability
might represent the kind of unfairness which would defeat an asser-
tion of forum law.' 73 Speaking in terms of the "expectations" of the
parties, the Court did not elaborate on the content of the unforeseea-
bility element. Such a notion, that expectations of the defendant
should influence choice of law, is certainly not a novel one. 174 Related
suggestions urge that the defendant's inability to foresee the applica-
tion of the forum's law should preclude such application 75 and that
an assertion of forum law resulting in "unfair surprise" to the defen-
dant is not valid. 76 How to define such unforeseeability or the situa-
tion in which unfair surprise might result remains an unanswered
question.
A curious byproduct, resulting from the separate development of
legislative and judicial jurisdictions, is the multiplicity of definitions
regarding the foreseeability concept. The definition to be used in a
case depends upon which doctrinal analysis is being employed. Profes-
sor Peterson described the distinction in the context of the World-
Wide discussion of foreseeability:
How does this foresight compare with that which we might require to
avoid unfair surprise on the choice-of-law or legislative jurisdiction
side of the equation? Just as with judicial jurisdiction there are two
possibilities-one describes foresight of factual risks, the other
foresight of legal consequences. World-Wide set foreseeability of
legal consequences as the test of judicial jurisdiction, but what
authorities there are suggest that the relevant inquiry for legislative
jurisdiction is into factual risks. I7
No explanations are offered in the Court's discussion of "factual"
versus "legal" foreseeability, and the doctrines themselves suggest
none. The obvious critique of the World-Wide reliance on legal conse-
quences is that such a definition is circular. How is one to predict
legal consequences? The prediction rests on what the courts have pre-
172. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). As a part of this showing, the defen-
dant might demonstrate the fortuitous nature of his or her relationship with the forum and the
generally local nature of his or her business.
173. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822.
174. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 317-318 (1981).
175. Id.
176. Shuts, 472 U.S. at 822.
177. See Peterson, supra note 14, at 43.
1991]
140 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:105
viously said (assuming they have spoken) about the legal consequences
of the defendant's conduct (until, of course, they change the conse-
quences in the case before them). Why the defendant's understanding
of legal consequences should be the focus of the courts' inquiry is un-
clear, and such a test certainly does not ensure the predictability the
Court envisioned. Thus foresight of factual risks, or unfair surprise
relative to factual consequences seems the better standard. Language
in Asahi suggests that the Court may be moving away from its "legal
consequences" focus toward a focus, once again, on factual foreseea-
bility, which should have enabled the defendant to foresee "being
haled into court" in the forum. 7
2. Portability of Defense
Another type of burden on the defendant, which may be a factor in
determining whether an assertion of personal jurisdiction is fair, re-
lates to the "portability" of the defendant's case. The Court should
make the following inquiries: Are there witnesses or evidence that will
be unavailable or difficult to produce in the forum? Will the defen-
dant be particularly burdened by having to defend in the forum's legal
system? The Supreme Court has suggested that such burdens may rise
to a constitutional level and may prevent the assertion of jurisdiction,
but it will be the rare case in which that occurs. 79 Furthermore, sev-
eral commentators have suggested that any burden on the defendant
may be cured by venue transfer provisions in the federal courts and
the doctrine of forum non conveniens.80
While burdens of the nature mentioned above seem to be of lesser
concern than those discussed in the preceding section, and while cases
in which such burdens alone would rise to the level of constitutional
unfairness are rare, such circumstances, in combination with unfair
surprise or lack of foreseeability, would certainly seem to bolster a
defendant's argument for unfairness. Therefore, "portability" bur-
dens, while in the usual case insufficient to establish an unreasonable
assertion of jurisdiction, should be considered in making unreasona-
bleness determinations. 8'
178. "As long as a participant in this process is aware that the final product is being mar-
keted in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise." Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
179. Burger King v. Rudcewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985).
180. See, e.g., Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doc-
trine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781 (1985).
181. They should be considered, particularly in the rare case like Asahi where defending in
the forum means coping with a foreign legal system as well.
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E. Sovereignty as a Threshold Requirement
Another problem with other proposals that suggest explicitly includ-
ing a sovereignty component in the personal jurisdiction test is their
retention of the World-Wide scheme which would continue to make
that sovereignty component a threshold requirement for jurisdic-
tion. I In World- Wide, the sovereignty component is embodied in the
requirement that the defendant must have purposefully availed itself
of the benefits and protections of the forum. The absence of such pur-
poseful contacts, the Court indicated in World-Wide, would bar juris-
diction even where the forum was otherwise fair and the defendant
was not inconvenienced. 8
Proposals to redefine the sovereignty concerns in terms of factors
other than or in addition to defendant's purposeful contacts seem to
retain this scheme. That is, sovereignty remains a prerequisite to juris-
diction or perhaps is the only real consideration regarding jurisdic-
tion.8 4 The reasonableness and fairness of the forum's taking
jurisdiction over the defendant never becomes an issue unless sover-
eignty over the defendant exists.
This Article takes the following positions: that the reasonableness
of assertions of jurisdiction required by the due process clause should,
instead, be a function of both sovereignty and of the burden on the
defendant; that a court must consider all aspects of the litigation in
order to balance the sovereignty concerns and the defendant's inter-
ests; that the over-arching concern is the reasonableness of the asser-
tion; and that a true balancing of interests is required, with neither
interest acting as a prerequisite to jurisdiction. While in rare cases ju-
risdiction without an established sovereignty interest may exist, 85 the
position suggested here will only make a difference in cases in which
the forum interest, though weak, is otherwise fair.
F. General Jurisdiction
After years of dormancy, scholarly attention has recently turned to
general jurisdiction.'8 Two noteworthy works posit very different
182. See, e.g. Weisburd, supra note 109, at 379.
183. World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980).
184. See Stein, supra note 13, at 690.
185. E.g., cases of voluntary or involuntary waiver. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Com-
pagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 704 (1982) (note that a doctrinal analysis premised
solely upon sovereignty or on sovereignty as a threshold concern must treat waivers as outside
that analysis).
186. See, e.g., Brilmayer, Haverkamp, Logan, Lynch, Neuwirth & O'Brien, A General Look
at General Jurisdiction, 66 Tax. L. REV. 721 (1988).
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views regarding the scope of general jurisdiction subdoctrine.'5 7 But
whether one focuses upon "dispute blind" versus "dispute neutral"
determinations 18 or upon Professor Brilmayer's somewhat narrower
approach,' 89 the Supreme Court's ambivalence towards sovereignty or
territoriality concerns makes any pronouncements in this area very
speculative. The Supreme Court has only recently acknowledged the
general versus specific jurisdiction terminology,"90 although arguably
it has upheld assertions of jurisdiction on a general jurisdiction basis
for some time. 9 This Article concludes that the Supreme Court's rec-
ognition of a general jurisdiction doctrine offers justification for, and
is consistent with, the balancing scheme proposed herein. "92
The general versus specific jurisdiction distinction is helpful in artic-
ulating different types of situations in which personal jurisdiction may
be asserted. Articulating those differences may aid in determining
what concerns should inform decision making in this area. Ultimately,
the question to be answered is the same-is it reasonable for the fo-
rum to assert jurisdiction over this defendant? Any conceptual frame-
work that purports to provide a way of answering that question ought
to encompass both general and specific jurisdiction."3
The general jurisdiction label is typically applied to a case in which
defendant's contacts with the forum state, while continuous and sys-
tematic, are unrelated to the claim before the court. The forum is
asked to assert jurisdiction over the defendant based upon these unre-
lated contacts. The Supreme Court has suggested that such jurisdic-
tion may exist, but the contacts required must be of a more
substantial nature than those that would support specific jurisdiction.
Some variations on the general jurisdiction theme are discussed below.
1. The National Corporation Versus the Local Plaintiff Injured
Outside the Forum
A resides in State X where she purchases an automobile manufac-
tured by the BIG Corporation in X. While driving her car in State X,
187. Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, 101 HAzv. L. REv. 1444 (1988);
Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HAzv. L. REv. 610 (1988).
188. Twitchell, supra note 187, at 613. Professor Twitchell uses this terminology to distin-
guish "an exercise of jurisdiction made without regard to the nature of the claim presented"
versus "an exercise of jurisdiction based in any way on the nature of the controversy."
189. Brilmayer, supra note 187, at 1445.
190. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n.10 (1984).
191. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
192. But see Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990). Justice Scalia suggests that
if general jurisdiction exists, it is in extremely limited circumstances. "It may be that whatever
special rule exists permitting continuous and systematic' contacts ... to support jurisdiction
with respect to matters unrelated to activity in the forum, applies only to Corporations, which
have never fitted comfortably in a jurisdictional regime based primarily upon de facto power
over the defendant's person." Id. at 2110 n. I (emphasis in original).
193. See Stein, supra note 13, at 758.
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the brakes malfunction, the car crashes, and A is killed. Subsequent
to the accident, B, A's widower, moves to State Y so that his children
may be closer to their grandparents. B files suit against BIG Corpora-
tion in Y, alleging negligence in the design and manufacture of the
car. BIG Corporation objects to personal jurisdiction because the car
was manufactured and sold in X, the accident occurred in X, and A
and B were residents of X at the time of both. B argues that general
jurisdiction may be maintained over BIG Corporation in Y because
BIG Corporation manufactures cars in State Y as well, sells 200,000
cars a year in Y, including the model manufactured in State X, and
receives millions of dollars a year in revenue from State Y.
Under current Supreme Court decisions and the new territoriality
justifications for jurisdiction, the assertion of personal jurisdiction
should be easy to justify. Surely the defendant's contacts with the fo-
rum can be described as purposeful, and economic benefit to the de-
fendant is clear. 194 Moreover, the "quality and nature" of defendant's
contacts certainly exceed the minimum quantum necessary to support
jurisdiction. 195 Similarly, sovereign authority would certainly seem to
exist. The forum, State Y, has a clear interest in regulating the con-
duct of a company such as BIG Corporation, which is not only manu-
facturing cars within its boundaries, but is also selling the same kind
of car, manufactured in State X, which allegedly caused the death of
A. Moreover, the forum has an interest in providing relief for B, the
plaintiff, and protecting its other citizens from defective products.
These interests would support Y in its application of its own law, the
touchstone of a theory dependant upon sovereign authority.
The balancing approach proposed by this Article would also sup-
port a decision in favor of jurisdiction on these facts. Strong forum
interests weigh in favor of jurisdiction. Similarly, the defendant will
be hard pressed to argue unfair surprise or that it was unable to fore-
see being subject to suit in the forum or that defending such a suit will
be unduly burdensome in terms of the portability of its defense. Ab-
sent any strong fairness factors favoring the defendant, the forum
should be able constitutionally to assert jurisdiction.
2. The National Corporation Versus the Nonlocal Plaintiff
Assume the same facts as above except that the plaintiff remains a
resident of X. As the Supreme Court has framed the doctrine, the
194. See supra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.
195. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984).
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plaintiff's residence should have no relevance. 96 The focus is on de-
fendant's contacts, which remain purposeful and substantial. There-
fore jurisdiction is proper. Under Professor Stein's proposal,
dependent as it is on sovereign authority, the case for personal juris-
diction seems slightly weakened. Modern choice of law doctrine cer-
tainly makes plaintiff's residence a very important, if not
determinative, factor. 97 To the extent Stein relies upon choice of law
doctrine, the determination may be affected. However, the forum cer-
tainly retains a regulatory interest sufficient to support application of
its own law and therefore to support personal jurisdiction.
The analysis proposed in this Article would still strongly support
jurisdiction. While, as suggested earlier, the plaintiff's residence in the
forum state should carry some weight, it should not be determinative,
nor should its absence preclude jurisdiction. Therefore, in the hypo-
thetical above, we are left with a strong sovereign interest, little or no
unfairness or burden on defendant, and good jurisdiction.
3. The National Corporation Versus the Nonlocal Plaintiff in a
Forum Where a Like Product is Neither Manufactured nor Sold
Assume the same facts as in first hypothetical except B remains in X
and the BIG Corporation only manufactures air conditioning units for
airplanes in State Y and sells no automobiles there. BIG Corporation
still engages in extensive business in the forum and receives substantial
revenues. This scenario is more problematic for theorists.
Assuming substantial, continuous, and systematic business activity
in the state (which is evidence of the defendant's purposeful contacts),
the results of the general jurisdiction cases suggest that general juris-
diction exists even though plaintiff's claim is totally unrelated to the
forum activities. 19 Professor Stein's proposed analytical framework
does not seem to result in jurisdiction nor does it explain the existing
caselaw. Absent a resident plaintiff and any factors indicating that Y
1%. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
Finally, implicit in the Court of Appeals' analysis of New Hampshire's interest is an
emphasis on the extremely limited contacts of the plaintiff with New Hampshire. But
we have not to date required a plaintiff to have 'minimum contacts' with the forum
State before permitting that State to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant. On the contrary, we have upheld the assertion of jurisdiction where such
contacts were entirely lacking.
Id. at 779 (emphasis in original).
197. But see Ely, supra note 158, at 180, for the argument "that it is unconstitutional for a
state to take the position that its protective policies extend only to its own citizens." (emphasis
deleted).
198. See, e.g., Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 408; Perkins v. Benquet, 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
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has an interest in regulating BIG's car manufacturing, it seems Y
would not have sufficient sovereign authority to either apply its own
law or assert jurisdiction over BIG. The proposal here would look to
factors supporting the sovereign's interest in the case. Those factors,
including a general concern for regulating a manufacturer who does
business in the state, while perhaps not sufficient to support the appli-
cation of the forum's law, are still entitled to be weighed in the bal-
ance. Moreover, this hypothetical is certainly a situation in which the
analogy to physical presence is not difficult to draw. A company en-
gaged in substantial activity, receiving substantial revenues from that
activity in the forum, is hardly in the position of an absent defendant.
An identifiable forum interest, weighed against a lack of burden on
defendant and an absence of unfair surprise, may support a determi-
nation that the forum is a fair and reasonable one. An assertion of
jurisdiction under these facts is consistent with a standard that focuses
upon the reasonableness or fairness of the jurisdiction considering
both sovereignty concerns and the defendant's interests.
VIII. THE NEW TERRITORIALITY AND STREAM OF COMMERCE THEORY
Once one accepts that sovereign authority, particularly that author-
ity strong enough to support application of the forum's law, should
be an explicit part of the personal jurisdiction test, the confusion sur-
rounding the stream of commerce theory begins to clear up. As earlier
described, the Supreme Court's most extensive discussion regarding
stream of commerce theory before Asahi was found in World-Wide.
But in World- Wide, the Court neglected to explain the relationship
between the two-part analysis it was applying in that case and the
stream of commerce cases. Thus, it was unclear whether meeting the
stream of commerce test satisfied both prongs of the two-part analy-
sis.
This Article has attempted to articulate an analysis which is unified
in the sense that it serves one overall goal, a determination whether
jurisdiction may reasonably be asserted by the forum. Two kinds of
concerns are addressed in the analysis in order to reach that goal. The
analysis suggested here avoids the dilemma in which the Supreme
Court found itself in Asahi, where it strained to be true to its earlier
decision in World- Wide, while addressing questions of unfair surprise
and burdensomeness regarding the defendant.
A. The Resulting Stream of Commerce Theory
The manufacturer, including the component manufacturer, who
places into the stream of commerce a product which lands in the fo-
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rum and does harm there, clearly has, by its activity, subjected itself
to the strong interest of the forum in regulating the conduct of manu-
facturers. Such an interest generally would support the forum's appli-
cation of its own law, whether the manufacturer is an "active" or
"passive" actor in the distribution scheme. Because the forum's inter-
est is strong, the defendant must meet a heavy burden to establish the
unfairness of the jurisdictional assertion. Usually, if facts establish
that the defendant used the stream of commerce to distribute its prod-
ucts to the forum, jurisdiction will be almost a matter of presumption.
B. Reconciling Asahi
This Article concludes that the O'Connor opinion, with its overreli-
ance upon the purposeful availment requirement of the existing analy-
sis, fails to follow the Court's own precedent beginning with
International Shoe and is an unworkable guide to lower courts. The
Brennan opinion' 99 and the Stevens opinion would both have reached
the conclusion that minimum contacts sufficient to support jurisdic-
tion existed, yet decided jurisdiction in these circumstances was un-
fair. While there are slight differences in terms of emphasis between
the two opinions, both opinions are consistent with the stream of
commerce theory outlined above, and both acknowledge that the de-
fendant's interests may render unfair an assertion of jurisdiction oth-
erwise supported by sovereign interests.
Consistent with the analysis suggested in this Article, a manufac-
turer, by using a pattern of distribution within a forum, would subject
itself to the strong regulatory authority of that forum. Only in the
unusual case would the defendant be able to overcome that authority.
Asahi appears to be such an unusual case. Two factors weighed heav-
ily against the assertion of personal jurisdiction in Asahi. First, Asahi
was a foreign defendant who did no direct business with California.
Second, the products liability action between the injured California
resident and the foreign manufacturer was no longer before the
Court; rather, only the indemnity action between Cheng Shin and
Asahi remained. In the final analysis, Asahi dictates that unfairness
decisions can be limited to the particular facts of the case. 200
199. Justice Brennan's multifactored analysis and rejection of the minimum contacts test as
spelled out in his dissent in World- Wide Volkswagen seems consistent with the analysis suggested
by this Article. The principle distinction is his emphasis on plaintiffs' interests. See World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stephens,
supra note 8, at 115.
200. It is the author's view that in light of both the suggested analysis here and the Supreme
Court's difficulty with the opinion that it is World- Wide Volkswagen that is wrongly decided.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The recent scholarly defense of a "new territoriality" which recog-
nizes the role of sovereign authority in personal jurisdiction determi-
nations is a welcome recognition of the concerns which underlie
doctrine in this area. Saying that sovereignty is and should be relevant
is not the same as saying sovereignty and the limits thereon should
replace minimum contacts as the test for personal jurisdiction. Using
the stream of commerce cases as the paradigm, this Article proposes a
test which focuses upon the reasonableness of the assertion of juris-
diction in light of both sovereignty concerns and the fairness of the
assertion to the nonresident defendant. Infusing those limits on sover-
eignty inherent in choice of law decisions into the personal jurisdiction
determination works a long overdue reconciliation of those related
doctrines.

